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RICOEUR AND MARCEL:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO POSTMODERN
DECONSTRUCTION
In a special way today, when the emphasis on the end of
metaphysics puts the very possibility of philosohy into question,
Gabriel Marcel's philosophical reflections, t9gether with those of his
astute disciple Paul Ricoeur, can shed light on the philosophical
enterpise for the future. In whatever form it survives', continental
philosophy, to be viable and adequate, must confront head on this
challenge from postmodern (antimodern) deconstructive thinkers. 1
And it is precisely the positive role of closure or limit in the
philosophies of Marcel and Ricoeur which can serve as a response to
that recent challenge, a response which must be made for the
redirection of continental philosophy in this country. It is our purpose
to dweil on this challenge, assess its positive contribution to recent
thinking, and then, to present an alternative philosophy at the limit of
reason as one of the most innovative and fruitful currents of
contemporary thinking. A first brief focus on the recent adaptations of
the role of the Kantian productive imagination will be helpful to
distinguish currents of thought in addressing the limit of thinking.
Three distinct roles of imagination emerge in philosophy at its
end-limit. First, in Heideggers finitization of reason, the productive
imagination is the source of reason itself and, as such, of the limit
placed by reason; all of which, in Heideggers view, are rooted in
1"Postmodern" is not th~ most felicitous term, and is not adequate for
many who are usually included under the label. To speak of "postmodemism"
is already to make it something solidified and structured, which is precisely
what many of its adherents oppose. Since they do agree in their opposition to
modernism, it might.be more benign to refere to this movement or style of
thinking as "antimodernism".
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"primordial· time ll ,2 bespeaking the closure which must be
transgressed--the closure toward the meaning of Being and toward
Being itself within language and within time. A second distinctive role,
one also arising out of Heidegger's proclamation of the end of
philosophy, that of deconstruction, as a postmodern-antimodern
critique of Heidegger, transforms Heidegger's interpretation of the
central role of the Kantian productive imagination by subordinating it
to chance, thus radically adjusting the nature of the end of
metaphysics. For the deconstruction of Derrida, the closure results
from the propensity to fixate ~n the effect within 'the flux of the
differance, a fixation which prevents the transgressing of philosophy
to differance, dissemination, and the "play of reason.1I But perhaps
there is yet another way of reaching this "closure,1I one which does
not go by either of 'lhe paths above and one which has not lost original
creativjty. If reason is not produced by imagination, 'lhen reason itself
limits knowledge to experience from above, putting the imagination in
a central postion both in knowledge and in thinking, as it is for both
Marcel and Ricoeur. And with the famous phenomenal/noumenal
distinction overturned, this limit enacted by reason on human
knowledge encompasses knowledge within the experience of reality
itself, but allows reason to reach beyond the boundary to something
of a more far-reaching significance, as it does in the philosophies of
both Marcel and Ricoeur~ The further development of deconstruction
and its challenge to philosophy must be further explored.
Derrida follows Heidegger's finitization of reason, but goes
further, and instead of centralizing the role of imagination,
subordinates it to chance, rendering it passive instead of creative,
and, like the late modern idealists, reduces everything to the same
status, under the sway of chance, thus eliminating the creativity so
central for both Marcel and for Ricoeur. In spite of Derrida's critique of
structuralism and of de Saussure, he hirnself succumbs to the allure of
the sciences of sign, ending up in a semeiological reductionism which
strips away meaning, reference, and persons involved in discourse in
favor of diacritical relationships in language as a system of signs with
the concomitant loss of words as words.
2Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James
S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1962).
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Derrida's shift of focus from the imagination to chance
originates from his critiques of Saussure's and Husserl's views of
signs as weil as from his critique of Husserl's view of the living
present,3 making chance and trace central to writing at the core of his
deconstruction.. It is for this reason that he refers to artistic or
imaginative discourse as a"floating signifier" or a "wild card which puts
play into play."4 And the imagination is limited to its reproductive
function, serving to yield indeterminancy and ambivalence into
diseourse in a move away from logocentrism.
Derrida, however, in opposition to Saussure's view of sign as
constituted by the signifying-signified relatJon, considers the signifier
to be independent from the relation to any particular signified and,
rather, to be related to other signifiers in relations of difference. In
considering the system of signifiers as inescapable, he has effectively
cut off presence and the present now, moving instead to a view of
language from which meaning, in a sense different from that of any
usual semantics, emerges. Consequently, his deconstruction begins
with the subordination of semantics in the traditional sense to syntax,
and the development of a view of syntax quite 'different from its usual
sense.
From such a syntax, as the root of ,the formal dimension of
language, the semantic dimension emerges. Thus, Derrida
subscribes to a new and far more radieal sense of syntax than that of
syntax as form in contrast to content. Rather, for hirn, syntax is the
condition making meaningfullanguage possible, and, at once, is itself
productive of the semantic dimension of language. This has been
3See the following articles for these two points of Derrida concerning
the living present and sign in language: Patrick L. Bourgeois, "Semiotics and
the Deconstruction of Presence: A Ricoeurian Alternative," American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVI; and Patrick L. Bourgeois,
"Trace, Semiotics, and the Living Present: Derrida or Ricoeur," Southwest
Philosophy Review, Vol. 9, 1993.
4Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern
Cu/ture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.), p. 96, quoting
Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, tr. by Barbara Johnsom (Chicago: The .
University of Chicago Press, 1981) p.93.
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referred to as allsyntax of syntax" from which the 'lformalH syntactic
properties can be syntactically composed and decomposed. 5 And
the use of language involves the play of differences, the play of traces
of future and past to bring about the present and its presence. This
play of traces is a "sort of inscription prior to writing, a protowriting
without a present origin....116 Thus, for Derrida, the trace is in some
elusive sense the "origin of sense in general ll if one can speak of
origin at all, and it is the IIdifferance which opens apearance
(l'apparaitre)".7 Already.it can be noted that the subject has become
decentered and thus that the role of the imagination, at best
reproductive, has been subordinated to the depersonalized play of
chance in language as a network of signs. .
This move from logocentrism and phonocentrism and the
extension of the notion of writing means that the imagination's role
has dissolved into the textual play of undecidability. The world
becomes a never-beginning, never-ending text where 'everything is
reflected in the medium or speculum of reading-writing without
breaking the mirrar.' It becomes clear from the above consideration
that, in order adequately to understand deconstruction, the
significance of its substitution of chance for the central role of
productive imagination must be understood, for this shift in the role of
play marks not only a distinctive thought, but a fundamentally different
attitudes from that which places the imagination in a central positon,
and opts for a philosohical thinking at the end of philosophy. The
option of chance at the core of a doctrine of dissemination and the
Derridian view of the Iiving present as effect, both of these within the
primacy of a unique syntactics, spills over into an entirely different
doctrine than one for which imagination is central, for which semantics
5Rodolphe Gaschel "Infrastructures and Systematicity:' in
Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida. ed. John
Sallis (Chicago: The University of Chlcago Press, 1987), pp. 11·12.
6Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays of Husserl's
Theory of Signs t tr. David B. Alllson and Newton Bercer (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 146.
7Jacques Derrida, 01 Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(Baitimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 65.
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of discourse takes precedence over syntax, and for which the unity of
the sentence on the semantic side is far more fundamental than the
unity of a sign in relation to others in the system. Sy contrasting these
differing roles of chance and imagination and their respective
. philosophies, the fundamental motif leading to one or the other
emerges into light: on the one hand, a thought skeptical to its core, in
which the human act of thinking, grasping and imagining is left, like a
ship in a tum~ltuous sea with no other control over the sail or rudder
except the haphazard capriciousness of the elements; and on the
other hand, a philosophy of limit in the context of reason's demand for
infinity and completeness. And it is a fundamental option which sets
the basic directions of these two courses of thought--an option for
chaos engulfing any effort toward sense, where sense transpires in
the context of spacing of lettering and of words in positions; or an
option for a sense and light arising out of what could be called the
fullness of the sense of existence. It is Marcel who first plotted this
latter course, 8 and Ricoeur who takes it up and develops it in terms·of
a hermeneutic of existence within the limit of reason.
Marcel's philosophical reflection expresses the question of
limit or end only obliquely, and in a way to which Ricoeur wants to
suggest an adjustment, as we shall see. For Marcei, in this context of
limit, the objectivity and characterizablity of the problematic are
surpassed in the notion of mystery to which access is gained in a
second reflection attuned to existence in such a way as to bring it to
thought. For Marcei, existence as mystery eludes any problematical
treatment, for it is irreducible to that tendency to characterize. It is not
a problem before me, but one which involves me, if it can be spoken
of at all in terms of problem, cis he does in saying: "A mystery is a
problem which encroaches upon itself".9 I cannot abstract myself from
the mystery of my own being. Thus, this dimension of mystery cannot
SMarcel expresses the overcoming of objectivity in favor of existence
before either Heidegger or Sartre were writing on human existence. He
published his famous essay, "Objectivityand ExistenceM in 1925 in Revue de
metaphysique et de morale. His Journal metaphysique, written in 1914 and
1915-1923, was published in 1927: (Paris, Librairie Gallimard).
9Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, tr. Manya Harari,
Seventh Paperbound Edition, (New York, Citadel Press, 1963).
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be eonsidered merely to be a problem which cannot be solved.
Rather, I am precis~ly what (who) is being reflected upon. On this
level there is an ontological exigence at the heart of human existence
which should prevent me from elosing myself off into the problematic
and the objeetive. And it is on this level that the "thou" is
encountered in presenee. If seeond refleetion were to allow itself to
begin other than with this realization, te., the presence of the other, it
would not be possible to get the "other" precisely as person back into
reflection. This presence is elosely linked to availability or readiness
for the other (disponibilite'). The unavailable person is not really there
for the other, but maintains a certain elosedness and destraction
toward something else.
With this move in second reflection to existence as mystery,
Mareel has turned toward the fullness of existence which illudes first
reflection and which is irreducible to it. This eoncretely situated being
is not able to be approached in a philosophical refleetion which is
detaehed, epistemologically oriented, instead of involved and
immersed in the conerete situation. Thus, in this critique of the
primaey of objeetivity, Mareel has overcome the primacy of
epistemology, and at once, found its souree: "...But what is more
important for me is the affirmation that existence is not only given, but
it is also giving--however paradoxieal that sounds. That is, existence is
the very condition of any thinking whatsoever.1I10 Existence as giving
encompasses ereativity. This giving as creative is the eentral motif of
Marcel's whole philosophy, as he himself says, in agreeing with
Kenneth Gallagher's interpretation: H••• as soon as there is ereation, in
whatever degree, we are in the realm of being (p.84). But the
eonverse is equally true: that is to say, there is doubtless no sense in
using the word 'being' exeept where ereation, in some form or other,
10Gabriei Marcei, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond: Including
Conversations B9tween Paul Ricoeur and Gabriel Marcei, tr. Stephen Jolin
and Peter McCormick (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973), p.
221 (in conversation 1).
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is in view."11 Marcel says that this insight grew as he concentrated
more on the relations between his philosophical thought, his dramatic
work, and even the attempt he has made in musical compositions.
We see here that Marcel, in his own rich and concrete way,
has turned to lived existence in its concrete fullness in -a unique
reflection different from and going beyond that of first reflection. It is
on this level that all of his celebrated themes, mystery, participation,
presence, fidelity, creativity, charity, faith, and hope, must be
interpreted, for, first reflection, oblivious to this level, would reduce
them to an abstraction or an objectivity. Thus mystery is Marcel's
manner of bringing into focus the attempt to think, beyond the
boundaries of knowledge, the wholeness of existence in the
question that most vitally concern human life, interest and heart. It is
somewhat an attempt to rE~ach the ineffable in arefleetion which will
never be adequate because of the richness of existence and of
being. For this he invokes faith. And this faith, intimately related to
hope and charity, is not exclusive of a philosophical faith in God.
In this context, Marcel seems to admit or to hint at the need for
an indirect access to the question of the whole, in thinking beyond
the boundaries of knowledge and of problematic reflection. In fact,
most of his reflection on the mystery of being takes place within a
certain domain going beyond the boundaries of the Kantian limit·-i.e.,
. the total and full existence beneath and beyond the realm of primary
reflection-·the domain of existence, which for Kant must remain
unknowable. And, in certain contexts, Marcel speaks of the need for
images, for myth, in order to prevent idolatrizing that which is reflected
upon here. He says concerning knowledge of the historically human:
"a thought which cannot be embodied withöut the help of myth--'lhe
price we have to pay for our own condition which is that of incarnate
11 Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy 01 Gabriel Marcel, forward by
Gabriel Marcel (New York: Fordham University Press), 1962.See Marcel's
forward to Gallagher's book, p. xiii, which refers to page 84 of Gallagher's
text.
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beings."12 Further, Marcel refers to the need for images which really
serve as symbols of something richer, with two levels of meaning for
the one for whom they speak in a certain way:
Must not the philosopher admit that we cannot really frea
ourselves from some key-images--for example that· of
heaven as the abode of the blessed··provided that he shows
that these images are bound up with the conditions of
existenee which belong to a wayfaring creature, and that
they cannot accordingly be considered as literally true. In
this sense I would say, for example, that heaven can hardly
appear to us, who are of the earth, as other than the sky
above; but in so far as the bond which holds us to the earth is
relaxed or changes its nature, it will be bound to present a
different aspect to uso We are fated to undergo a
metamorphosis whose nature we can foresee only very
imperfectly, and it is just on the idea of this metamorphosis
that rests the revival of orphism whose imperious demands
must be familiar to many of us today. Hence again it follows
that salvation ean also be better eoneeived by us as a road
rather than astate; and this links up again with some
profound views of the Greek Fathers, in particular SI.
Gregory of Nyssa.13
We now turn to Ricoeur's way of dealing with concrete
reflection as a hermeneutic of existence, gently critiquing Marcel's
uexperiential thinking", 14 and responding to the challenge of
deconstruction in a Marcelian style of concrete philosophy.
12Gabriel Marcei, The Mystery of Being (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1960), vol. 11, p. ix. "The Hegelian idea of history, which is the
source of the vilest idolatries of our time, is only a counterfeit or a perversion
of a much more profound thought, a thought which cannot be embodied
without the help of myth··the priee we have to pay for our own condition which
is that of incarnate beings. Here it is that philosophy reaches it boundaries,
and awaits the first glimmers of the fires of revelation."
13i/id., Vol. 11, 204·205.
14Gabriel Marcei, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, IIConversation 211 , p.
229.
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It is Ricoeur's view of a central role of productive imagination,
rooted in his interpretation of the priority of the semantie in language
and the unity of language in the sentence, which pulls the props out
from under Derrida's reduction of the imagination and which at once
offers a richer and more viable view of language and semantic
innovation at the center of his hermeneutic.
In his critieal remarks to Marcel, Ricoeur points out the need .
for critique in the manner of a first Copernican revolution, and the
further need for a second naivete after that revolution. Thus, his own
addition to Marcel's doctrine is twofold: first in the direction of the
Copernican revolution, he is not adverse to engaging in reflections on
human being of an abstract and pure kind, one instance of whieh he
develops as eidetic phenomenology, a legacy which he accepts from
Husserl (his other great teacher in addition to Marcel); and his
insistence on a philosophy of limit··i.e., one which moves to the
reflection on totality and on the full concreteness in terms of a
revamped Kantian limit. And it is here that we can return to the
dialogue with deconstruction, after a few words about Ricoeur's
hermeneutics of existence as a philosophy of limit, in response to the
question of how to think beyond the limit or boundary.
Ricoeur's eoncrete refleetion, in contrast to that of Marcel,
takes place as a hermeneutics of existence, a hermeneutics which
gives an indireet aeeess to conerete existence in its fullness and to
the totality in its illusiveness. Ricoeur, appropriating Kant's doctrine of
the limit concept imposed by reason on knowledge, contends that
objeetive knowledge is the labor of understanding (Verstand), but .
that understanding does not exhaust the power of reason { Vernunft)
which remains the function of the uneonditioned. This distance and
this tension between reason and understanding finds an expression
in the notion of limit whieh for Kant is not to be identified with
boundary. The eoncept of "limit" does not primarily imply that our
knowledge is limited, but, rather, that the quest for the uneonditioned
puts limits on the claim of objective knowledge. '" Limit' is not a fact,
but an act," 15 meaning that in its quest for the unconditioned, reason
actively puts limits to the claim of objective knowledge to become
absolute in a way parallel to Marcel's critique of the Hegelian absolute.
1SPaui Ricouer, "Biblical Hermeneutics", Sameia I~ (1975), p. 142.
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Ricoeür, however, wants to give to the limit-concept of Kant a less
negative function than the prohibition addressed by reason to the
claim of objective knowledge to absolutize itself. Rather, for Ricoeur,
the "empty" requirement of an unconditioned finds a certain
fulfillment in indirect language such as metaphorical language, which
says what things are IIke rather than what things are, and that the 'Iis
like" implies an "is not."16 In the present context, however, the
philosophy of limits dweils primarilyon the limits which are essential to
the philosophy of human existence within reason's quest for totality
and for completeness. As Ricoeur says: "I think everything and I
demand everything, but 1am never able to know it. Kant only applied
to cosmology his golden rule of the limiting function of the concept of
the thing-in-itself."17 Ricoeur wants to extend this application to
apply, in the present context, to the totality of man 18 and to the totality
of history,19 thus using the Iimiti':1g concept as regulative in such a way
as to demand that reason think such totalities from indirect
expressions. For, it is only as a regulative idea that the totlity and the
unity of man, along wi'lh the indirectly accessible Sacred, are given to
thought. And here the imagination serves a central role, for it is the
imagination which is intimately involved in the semantic innovation
leading to the culmination of Ricoeur's reflection on human being.
This role, however, does not hedge the role of reason (spirit) which
gives to the imagination the ideas which stimulate it to creative
thought, which, in the thinking more, cannot ever be adequate to the
ideas. Thus, the demand for totality within the context of a bond to
existence, through desire and spirit, allows a glimpse again at the
16lbid.
17Paul Ricoeur, "IlWhat Does Humanism Mean?lt, in Political and Social
Essays, ed. by David Steward and Joseph Bien (Athens, Ohio: Ohio
University Press,1974), p. 86.
18Paul Ricoeur. Fallible Man (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1965),pp. 75, 76,p.3, TU.
19Paul Ricoeur, "What Does Humanism Mean?". p. 86. "But is is "
necessary to apply to the totality of history this limiting role of the ideal of its
total meaning and to raise it up against all pretensions that would say what
this total meaning is."
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infinite human quest within a finite human situation. Such treatments
of philosophy, originally intimated by Marcei, and. explicated by
Ricoeur, allow for continual and ongoing reflection on the mystery of
existence in spite of the challenge from deconstruction. A few words
further are now in order eoneerning a positive influence of
deconstruction for our present purpose.
In the light of the above considerations on the end-limit of
philosophy, something quite positive can be gleaned from the recent
emphasis and direction of continental philosophy, especially in
America, in the proclamation of the end of metaphysics and of
philosophy. In the attempt to be attuned properly, let us first take up
the point of the deepening passage within the critique of Heidegger
accused by Derrida of hanging onto a presence of being in his efforts
to overcome metaphysics, and thus of not going far enough. For,
Heidegger,in leading to a refocusing on the totality of the
hermeneutical situation, or on the whole network of the
presuppositional structure, has thrown into focus the sense of Being
in its unity through which anything emerges into its being. But
according to deconstructionists, .he fails to reach beyond this
temporality structure and toward that from which it is the effeet, the
singularity of the flux. And, just as Heidegger approaches Kant and
the whole history of metaphysics with his precomprehension and
question of Being to see how Kant and others, at least subliminally,
posed the question, so t90, do the current critics of Heidegger, the
post-Heideggerian deconstructionists, now bring their own
precomprehension to their deconstruction of texts. And that which is
in precomprehension precisely as other is not reachable as such, and
everything in experience and awareness relates to it as other, both in
the depth of the human and beyond.
It is precisely here that a positive message can be gleaned
from deconstruction's subversion of language and philosophy.
Without going quite in the same direction, the "other" to which it leads
can be interpreted in another way. Take the example of lived time and
cosmic time. In a sense lived time is part of cosmic time, because it is
cosmic time in the lived experience of a cosmic, human being. What is
clear is that the self-comprehension of lived time is at once a self-
comprehension of cosmic time in that instance of the lived. And it
must be seen that the "other" here is the cosmic in the lived, which is
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mediated, or expressed in the lived, which itself is experieneed only in
a quasi unity of precomprehension. And by a eertain extrapolation,
we can see the eharacteristics of that other as cosmic. This positive
element fosters a move beyond a limited hermeneutie
phenomenology of existenee, a move which the philosophy of Mareel
fosters in the manner of conerete refleetion. And a parallel analysis
holds true of language as that to which humans are receptive, and in
terms of whieh they become decentered. Thus, deeonstruction
indicates for a philosophy at the limit of reason, more viable than
deconstruction itself, a possible path tor further inquiry.
What daes this say about philolsophy at its end? That its end
as boundary is transgressed and therefore philosophy becomes
thinking in its context of the whole or of eompletion. But, due to the
limit of human experience, and to the quest for the total in thinking
(and in action), philosaphy will never be completed. Thus. one could
perhaps say that philosophy culminates precisely in its attempt to stay
attuned to its limited access to the total--to completion, and to "see" or
to interpret at this point, its ultimate significanee. And is this not what
Marcel and Rieoeur are doing?
Th~s, as an alternative to Derrida's semeiological
reductionism, the concrete ontology of Marcel and Ricoeur provides a
philosophy which does not displace the imagination in its role in
thinking, subvert the semantic as the essential dimension of
language, or reduee the living present to an abstract. discreteness.
Rather, their philosophy of existence, with its essential relation to
language, prevents the reduction ot language to sterile and empty
signs and existence to some "other", while preserving a certain
positive eletrlent of the mystery within and beyond existence. The
deconstructive inversions of these makes a mockery of meaning,
distorts language, and renders philosophy meaningless. Rather, the
philosaphy of Marcel and Ricoeur reestablishes same faith in
philosophical analysis as having something worthwhile to say,
especially when it interprets existenee and language.
Loyola U. • New Orleans
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